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The article deals with the different approaches followed by the Turkish
Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in
party prohibition cases. The Turkish Constitution and even more so the Law
on Political Parties contain a long list of party bans, the violation of which
leads to the closure of the party by the Constitutional Court. The Turkish
Constitutional Court, both under the 1961 and the 1982 Constitutions,
interpreted these provisions in an exceedingly illiberal manner, and has so
far closed down a total of 24 political parties. Turkish rules and practices
concerning the prohibition of political parties are among the most important
‘democracy deficits’ of the Turkish political system. In the article, the
Turkish Court’s illiberal approach to party prohibition cases, especially
those involving the protection of the national and territorial integrity of the
state and of the principle of secularism, is compared with the much more
liberal criteria developed by the ECtHR and the Venice Commission.
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Introduction
This article aims to compare the different approaches followed by the Turkish
Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in
party prohibition cases. The article shows that while the former pursues an
‘ideology-based’ approach putting emphasis on the interests of the state as it
perceives them, the latter maintains a ‘rights-based’ approach considering the
free operation of political parties as one of the indispensable conditions of a free
democratic order. The illiberal approach of the Turkish Court is demonstrated to
be mainly a function of the basic philosophy of the 1982 Constitution.
It is generally agreed that the Turkish Constitution of 1982, the product of a
military coup, still retains many of the authoritarian, statist, and tutelary character-
istics that reflect the mentality of its military founders. Although the 15 amend-
ments that the Constitution has undergone since 1987 has democratized and
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liberalized it to a considerable degree, it has not been possible to completely
eliminate some of its birth defects. Thus, one of the most important areas of
remaining democratic deficits concerns the low level of protection granted to
political parties. Both the 1961 and the 1982 Constitutions embraced the
concept of so-called ‘militant democracy’, but the latter went much further in
that direction than its predecessor, as will be spelled out below.
The situation is further aggravated by the fact that the long list of prohibitions
contained in the Constitution, and an even a longer one in the Law on Political
Parties, have been implemented with excessive zeal and rigidity by the Turkish
Constitutional Court. It has been convincingly argued that in matters concerning
political party freedom, the Turkish Court has followed an ‘ideology-based’
approach rather than a ‘rights-based’ approach. ‘While the liberal paradigm
gives priority to individuals and their rights . . . the “ideology-based” paradigm
favours the state and society over the individual . . . The Turkish Constitutional
Court has adopted an “ideology-based” paradigm in deciding political party
cases. This paradigm reflects a positivist, one-dimensional, monolithic, and
authoritarian outlook.’1
Surely, Turkey is not the only European country that has been inspired by the
concept of militant democracy. However, while party closures are extremely rare in
such countries, the Turkish Constitutional Court has closed down six parties under
the 1961 Constitution, and 18 parties under the 1982 Constitution. Most of these
rulings were based on the alleged violation of the constitutional provisions
protecting the indivisible national and territorial integrity of the state or its
secular character.
To elucidate the root causes of the difference between the ‘ideology-based’
approach of the Turkish Court and the much more liberal, ‘rights-based’ jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and of the principal
European Constitutional Courts requires an in-depth analysis of the Turkish
political system, beyond the scope of this study. It suffices to say here that the
founding philosophy of the Republic (i.e., Kemalism) strongly stressed the
principles of a unitary, national, and secular state. These values have been
deeply internalized by the judiciary as well as by other sectors of the state elites
such as the military. Thus, in the words of a leading Turkish constitutional scholar:
ever since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish legal complex has
been mobilised to consolidate the regime by both eliminating the potential threats and
providing legal justifications for the authoritarian behaviour of the regime. Thus the
legal complex has functioned as part and parcel of both the repressive and ideological
state apparatus, to use Althusser’s terms. The Turkish legal complex, the judiciary at
its centre, has consistently sought to align itself with the ruling stratum of the Repub-
lic, namely the military and civilian bureaucracy. The liberalization of the regime has
been a process which involves a political struggle between the state elites and the pol-
itical elites. In this struggle, the judiciary alongside the military appears to be one of
the most conservative state apparatuses that resist the liberalization and democratiza-
tion of the legal and political life of the country.2
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Although both the 1961 and the 1982 Turkish Constitutions recognized political
parties as ‘indispensable elements of the democratic political life’, they did not
provide an unlimited freedom for political parties.3 Under Article 57 of the 1961
Constitution, ‘the statutes, programs and activities of political parties shall conform
to the principles of democratic and secular Republic based on human rights and free-
doms, and to the basic provision of the integrity of the State with its territory and
nation. Parties that do not conform to them shall be permanently closed down’.
Similarly, Article 68 of the 1982 Constitution as amended in 1995 states that:
the statutes, programs, and actions of political parties shall not be contrary to the inde-
pendence of the State, its indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, human
rights, the principles of equality and the rule of law, national sovereignty, the prin-
ciples of the democratic and laic Republic; they shall not aim to advocate or establish
class or group dictatorship or any other kind of dictatorship; they shall not encourage
the commitment of crimes.
These two articles, despite the differences in the languages, essentially protect the
same fundamental values, namely the independence and the territorial and national
integrity of the state, Republicanism, human rights, and a democratic and secular
state. Certain concepts referred to in the text of the 1982 Constitution, such
as equality and the rule of law, national sovereignty, and the prohibition of
dictatorship, are already implied by the term ‘democratic state’, and are, therefore,
unnecessary repetitions. Similarly, the prevention of incitement to crimes is a
natural and fundamental function of any state.
According to the fifth and sixth paragraphs of Article of the 1982 Constitution,
violations of these principles is a cause for the permanent prohibition of a political
party. Paragraph 5 regulates the cases where such violations are committed through
party statutes or programs. Paragraph 6 regulates the situations in which the party
becomes a ‘focus’ of such anti-constitutional activities. In addition to the prohibi-
tions stipulated by Article 68, under paragraph 10 of Article 69 ‘those political
parties that receive financial aid from foreign states, international organizations,
and real persons or legal personalities that are not of Turkish nationality shall be
permanently closed down’. It may be argued that the 1995 amendments to Articles
68 and 69 of the Constitution represent a significant improvement in the status of
political parties compared to the original text of these articles.4 In the following
pages, the main material criteria for prohibition, namely the protection of the
territorial and national integrity of the state and of the principle of secularism,
will be discussed with reference to the rulings of the Turkish Constitutional
Court and the ECtHR. This will be followed by an analysis of the prohibition
criteria developed by the ECtHR and the Venice Commission.
The principle of the indivisible territorial integrity of the state
The concept of the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation
should be analysed under two headings: the territorial integrity of the state and
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the national integrity of the state. The reflection of the constitutional provision pro-
tecting the territorial integrity of the state in the Law on Political Parties is Article
80 of the Law entitled ‘The Protection of the Unitary Nature Of The State’. It is
debatable whether this provision is a simple extension and concretization of the
constitutional prohibition or a new prohibition beyond the mandate of the Consti-
tution. It may be argued that the unitary state is not a necessary consequence of the
principle of the territorial integrity of the state. Territorial integrity of the state can
be reconciled with federal or regional forms of government. This view is supported
by the fact that in most of the federal or regional states of the world, the territorial
integrity of the state is under no serious threat. Therefore, this provision of the Law
on Political Parties seem to contradict Article 68 of the Constitution.5
The Turkish Constitutional Court, however, interprets the territorial integrity of
the state in a manner to protect the unitary nature of the state as well. Thus, the
Court in its prohibition ruling concerning the Democracy Party stated that:
The principle of the indivisible integrity encompasses the protection of the indepen-
dence and the territorial and national integrity of the state. This historical character-
istic of the Turkish Republic, which has been a unitary state since its establishment,
has been reflected in the Constitutions and strict sanctions have been provided for
its protection . . . This structure is the raison d’étre of the nation, and it cannot be
compared with the conditions of other multi-national countries. No concessions
can be made with regard to this fundamental principle . . . The Constitution, which
is based on the principle of unitary state, does not permit federal state. Therefore,
political parties cannot include federal system in their programs, and cannot advocate
such a structure . . . As the principle of nation-state does not permit the notion of
multi-national state, there is no room for a federal structure in such a system. In a
federal system, (multiple) sovereignties are exercised by the federated states.
Whereas, in a unitary state, there is only one sovereignty.6
In the same ruling, the Court precludes even regional states by stating that ‘the
Constitution is closed to such discriminatory procedures as autonomy or self-
rule for regions’, even though regional state is a variant of a unitary state. Further-
more, the Court commits another juridical error by arguing that in a federal state,
federated states also exercise their sovereignties. Sovereignty, by its very nature,
cannot be exercised by more than one unit. What the federated states exercise in
a federal state is not sovereignty but a limited state power defined by the federal
constitution. Another problem involves the Court’s confusing multi-nationalism
with federalism. Obviously, not all federal states are multi-national states. The
Turkish Court reiterated the same reasoning in an earlier ruling concerning the
Socialist Party.7
However, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that the prohi-
bition of the Socialist Party amounted to a violation of Article 11 of the European
Convention of Human Rights. In its reasoning the ECtHR stated that:
having analysed Mr Perinçek’s [the party leader] statements, the Court finds nothing
in them that can be considered a call for the use of violence, an uprising or any other
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form of rejection of democratic principles. On the contrary, he stressed on a number of
occasions the need to achieve the proposed political reform in accordance with demo-
cratic rules, through the ballot box and by holding referenda.
In the opinion of the Court, ‘the statements put forward a political programme with
the essential aim being the establishment, in accordance with democratic rules, of a
federal system in which Turks and Kurds would be represented on an equal footing
and on a voluntary basis. Admittedly, reference is made to the right to self-deter-
mination of the ‘Kurdish nation’ and its right to ‘secede’; however, read in their
context, the statements using these words do not encourage secession from
Turkey but seek rather to stress that the proposed federal system could not come
about without the Kurds’ freely given consent, which should be expressed
through a referendum’. In an even more noteworthy passage, the Court argues that:
the fact that such a political programme is considered incompatible with the current
principles and structures of the Turkish State does not make it incompatible with the
rules of democracy. It is of the essence of democracy to allow diverse political pro-
grammes to be proposed and debated, even those that call into question the way a
State is currently organized, provided that they do not harm democracy itself.8
The principle of the indivisible national integrity of the state
The reflections of the constitutional principle of the national integrity of the state
can be found in Articles 81, 82, and 83 of the Law on Political Parties (Law
No. 2820, dated 22 April 1983). The most important of those which provided a
basis for many prohibition rulings of the Constitutional Court is Article 81 entitled
‘the prevention of creating minorities’. The Article stipulates that:
Political parties:
a) Cannot maintain that there are minorities in the territory of the Republic of
Turkey, based on differences of national or religious culture, or race, or
language.
b) Cannot pursue the aim or engage in activities to harm national unity by
way of creating minorities in the territory of the Republic of Turkey
through protecting, developing or spreading languages and cultures other
than the Turkish language or culture.
c) Cannot use or distribute posters, placards, audio and video tapes, brochures
and declarations written in languages other than Turkish in the writing and
publishing of their statutes and programs, congresses, open or closed hall
gatherings, public meetings and propaganda activities; nor can they
remain indifferent to those actions perpetrated by others. However, their
statutes and programs may be translated into a foreign language not
prohibited by law.
In the same vein, Article 82 prohibits the pursuit of regionalism and racism, and
Article 83 prohibits activities that would harm the principle of equality. It has
Democratization 129
long been maintained that Article 81 of the Law on Political Parties introduces a
prohibition much beyond the constitutional mandate, and therefore is clearly uncon-
stitutional.9 Indeed minorities, being sociological realities, cannot be superficially
created by political parties, just as their denial by political parties does not make
them disappear. The prohibition regarding the protection, development, and spread-
ing of languages and cultures other than the Turkish language and culture reminds
one of a ‘cultural genocide’ in the words of a leading Turkish constitutionalist.10
The Turkish Constitutional Court has interpreted the principle of the national
integrity of the state in an extremely rigid manner in its prohibition rulings on a
large number of parties. For example, in its decision concerning the Democracy
Party, the Court asserted that:
The recognition of minority status based on differences of race and language is
incompatible with the notion of territorial and national integrity. Just as citizens of
other origins, the citizens of Kurdish origin are not prohibited from expressing
their identity; it has been stipulated, however, that they are not a minority or a differ-
ent nation, that they cannot be conceived outside the Turkish nation, and that they are
placed in the integrity of the state. Citizens of Kurdish origin do not carry a charac-
teristic conforming to the sociological and legal definitions of a minority; nor is there
any legal rules that differentiates them from other citizens. It does not make any sense
to transform unlimited rights into limited rights, and to transform being a nation itself
into being a minority. It is clear that the aim is to accomplish secession . . . One cannot
violate the constitutional principle of national integrity by differentiating between
Turkish and Kurdish nations. In the State of the Republic of Turkey, there is one
state and one nation, not more than one nations. Even though there are individuals
of different origins in the Turkish Nation, they are all placed in the unity of the
Turkish Nation . . . It is impossible to recognize validity to such dangerous aims
derived from certain political causes and foreign factors . . . and intensified by
claims of human rights and freedom.
The relevant passage of the Constitutional Court’s decision ends with the rather lit-
erary and emotional statement that ‘the State is SINGLE; the territory is a WHOLE;
the nation is ONE’.11
These decisions of the Constitutional Court involve a number of highly deba-
table points. First of all, one may ask why the citizens of Kurdish origin do not
conform to the ‘sociological and legal definitions’ of a minority. Sociologically
speaking, a group of people who are different from the majority of population
on the basis of language, race, religion, sect, or ethnicity, and are conscious of
these differences, constitute a minority. Although there is no generally accepted
definition of national minorities in the international human rights law, certain
proposals put forward in this regard are not fundamentally different from this
sociological definition.12 A second debatable point is the Court’s argument that
minority rights are inferior to the rights deriving from being a citizen of a
nation-state. On the contrary, minority rights are those that are provided in addition
to general citizenship rights with the aim of providing ‘positive discrimination’ for
the members of minorities.13 Other controversial points in the Constitutional
130 E. Özbudun
Court’s ruling are the arguments equating the recognition of cultural rights for min-
orities with ‘racism’, maintaining that such claims have nothing to do with ‘demo-
cratic and political rights’, and asserting that they are influenced by ‘foreign
factors.’
There appears to be a fundamental difference between these decisions of the
Constitutional Court and those of the ECtHR. The European Court in its ruling
on the Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) made frequent references to its
earlier decision concerning the Socialist Party. The European Court reasons that
‘having analysed ÖZDEP’s programme, the Court finds nothing in it that can be
considered a call for the use of violence, an uprising or any other form of rejection
of democratic principles’. While the Court admits that:
in its programme ÖZDEP also refers to the right to self-determination of the ‘national
or religious minorities’ . . . taken in context, those words do not encourage people to
seek separation from Turkey but are intended instead to emphasise that the proposed
political project must be underpinned by the freely given, democratically expressed,
consent of the Kurds . . . Further, the Court has previously held that one of the prin-
ciple characteristics of democracy is the possibility it offers of resolving a country’s
problems through dialogue, without recourse to violence, even when they are
irksome. Democracy thrives on freedom of expression. From that point of view,
there can be no justification for hindering a political group solely because it seeks
to debate in public the situation of part of the State’s population and to take part in
the nation’s political life in order to find, according to democratic rules, solutions
capable of satisfying everyone concerned.14
Secularism
The principle of secularism is protected by a number of constitutional provisions,
among which is Article 68, which provides that activities violating this principle
is a cause for prohibiting a political party. The reflections of this prohibition are
found in Articles 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, and 89 of the Law on Political Parties.
These provisions involve the protection of Atatürk’s principles and reforms
(Art. 84), respect for Atatürk (Art. 85), protection of the principles of secularism
and the prohibition of the advocacy of the return of khilafat (the khalif is supposed
to be the temporal and spiritual head of all Muslims. The office was held by
the Ottoman sultans from 1517 to 1924, when it was abolished) (Art. 86), the
prohibition of the exploitation of religion and things held sacred by religion
(Art. 87), prohibition of religious demonstrations (Art. 88), and the preservation
of the status of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Art.89).
Since its inception the Constitutional Court has closed down five parties on
account of their alleged anti-secular activities. These are the National Order
Party (20 May 1971), Turkey Peace Party (25 October 1983), Freedom and
Democracy Party (23 November 1993), Welfare Party (16 January 1998), and
the Virtue Party (22 June 2001). On the other hand, the Court did not rule
against the Democratic Peace Movement Party, which was accused of the same
violation in its ruling dated 22 May 1997.
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The Constitutional Court, in its ruling on the Freedom and Democracy Party,
asserted that the party violated the Constitution by having proposed the abolition
of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, although the Court also found the party
guilty of having violated the national and territorial integrity of the state. The
ECtHR, in its turn, reiterated its views expressed in the Socialist Party case,
stating that being considered incompatible with the current principles and structures
of the Turkish state does not make a proposal incompatible with the rules of
democracy.15 However, the most important case for a comparative study of the
Constitutional Court’s and the ECtHR’s approaches to party prohibitions is the
Welfare Party (Refah) case, since it is the only Turkish case where the ECtHR
ruled that such prohibition did not violate the principles of the European Convention.
The Constitutional Court banned the Welfare Party (WP) on 16 January 1998,
on the grounds that it had become a focus of anti-secular activities.16 On 31 July
2001, a chamber of the ECtHR gave judgement that there had been no violation
of the Convention. At the request of the applicants, the case was referred to the
Grand Chamber, which decided unanimously on 13 February 2003 that there
had been no violation of the Convention.17
The Grand Chamber first analyses in general terms the conditions under which
political parties can be prohibited. It argues:
that a political party may promote a change in the law or the legal and constitutional
structures of the State on two conditions: firstly, the means used to that end must be
legal and democratic; secondly, the change proposed must itself be compatible with
fundamental democratic principles. It necessarily follows that a political party whose
leaders incite violence or put forward a policy which fails to respect democracy or
which is aimed at the destruction of democracy and the flouting of the rights and free-
doms recognized in a democracy cannot lay claim to the Convention’s protection
against penalties imposed on these grounds . . . In view of the very clear link
between the Convention and democracy no-one must be authorised to rely on the
Convention’s provisions in order to weaken or destroy the ideals and values of a
democratic society. Pluralism and democracy are based on a compromise that
requires various concessions by individuals or groups of individuals, who must some-
times agree to limit some of the freedoms they enjoy in order to guarantee greater
stability of the country as a whole. In that context, the Court considers that it is not
at all improbable that totalitarian movements, organized in the form of political
parties, might do away with democracy, after prospering under the democratic
regime, there being examples of this in modern European history.18
The ECtHR then discusses the conditions under which the prohibition of a political
party meets a ‘pressing social need’, and concentrates on the following points: (i)
whether there was plausible evidence that the risk to democracy, supposing it had
been proven to exist, was sufficiently imminent; (ii) whether the acts and speeches
of the leaders and members of the political party concerned were imputable to the
party as a whole; and (iii) whether the acts and speeches imputable to the political
party formed a whole which gave a clear picture of a model of society conceived
and advocated by the party which was incompatible with the concept of a
‘democratic society’.19
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After that, the ECtHR then proceeds to examine whether the WP ruling of the
Turkish Constitutional Court meets these criteria. The ECtHR argues that
while it can be considered, in the present case, that Refah’s policies were dangerous
for the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, the real chances that
Refah would implement its programme after gaining power made that danger more
tangible and more immediate. That being the case, the Court cannot criticise the
national courts for not acting earlier, at the risk of intervening prematurely, and
before the danger concerned had taken shape and become real. Nor can it criticize
them for not waiting, at the risk of putting the political regime and civil peace in
jeopardy, for Refah to seize power and swing into action . . . in order to implement
its plans.20
The Court further reasons that the statements by Necmettin Erbakan (the party
leader), Şevket Kazan and Ahmet Tekdal (two of its vice-presidents), Şevki
Yılmaz, Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, and Halil İbrahim Çelik (MPs), and Şükrü Kara-
tepe (mayor of Kayseri) were imputable to the party as a whole.21
With regard to the grounds for prohibition, the ECtHR finds the WP’s advocacy
of a plurality of legal systems incompatible with democracy and quotes verbatim
the reasoning of the Chamber. Thus:
the Court considers that Refah’s proposal that there should be a plurality of legal
systems would introduce into all legal relationships a distinction between individuals
grounded on religion, would categorise everyone according to his religious beliefs
and would allow him rights and freedoms not as an individual but according to his
allegiance to a religious movement. The Court takes the view that such a societal
model cannot be considered compatible with the Convention system, for two
reasons. Firstly, it would do away with the State’s role as the guarantor of individual
rights and freedoms and the impartial organiser of the practice of the various beliefs
and religions in a democratic society, since it would oblige individuals to obey, not
rules laid down by the State in the exercise of its above-mentioned functions, but
static rules of law imposed by the religion concerned.
But the State has a positive obligation to ensure that everyone within its jurisdiction
enjoys in full, and without being able to waive them, the rights and freedoms guaran-
teed by the Convention. Secondly, such a system would undeniably infringe the
principle of non-discrimination between individuals as regards their enjoyment of
public freedoms, which is one of the fundamental principles of democracy. A differ-
ence in treatment between individuals in all fields of public and private law according
to their religion or beliefs manifestly cannot be justified under the Convention, and
more particularly Article 14 thereof, which prohibits discrimination. Such a differ-
ence in treatment cannot maintain a fair balance between, on the one hand, the
claims of certain religious groups who wish to be governed by their own rules and
on the other the interest of society as a whole, which must be based on peace and
on tolerance between the various religions and beliefs.22
In the same vein, the Grand Chamber finds the WP’s advocacy of a sharia-based
government incompatible with democracy, quoting from the verdict of the
Chamber, which stated that
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like the Constitutional Court, the Court considers that sharia, which faithfully reflects
the dogmas and the divine rules laid down by religion, is stable and invariable.
Principles such as pluralism in the political sphere or the constant evolution of
public freedoms have no place in it. The Court notes that, when read together, the
offending statements, which contain explicit references to the introduction of
sharia, are difficult to reconcile with the fundamental principles of democracy as con-
ceived in the Convention taken as a whole. It is difficult to declare one’s respect for
democracy and human rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on
sharia, which clearly diverges from Convention values, particularly with regard to
its criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and
the way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with
religious precepts . . . In the Court’s view, a political party whose actions seem to
be aimed at introducing sharia in a State party to the Convention can hardly be
regarded as an association complying with the democratic ideal that underlies the
whole of the Convention.23
Finally, the Grand Chamber agreed with the Chamber that some statements by the
WP spokesmen constituted a call for the use of violence. Thus, it is stated that
while it is true that Refah’s leaders did not, in government documents, call for the use
of force and violence as a political weapon, they did not take prompt practical steps to
distance themselves from those members of Refah who had publicly referred with
approval to the possibility of using force against politicians who opposed them. Con-
sequently, Refah’s leaders did not dispel the ambiguity of these statements about the
possibility of having recourse to violent methods in order to gain power and retain it.24
As a result, the Grand Chamber ruled that the prohibition of the WP responded
to a ‘pressing social need’ and conformed to the principle of proportionality. Thus,
it found no violation of Article 11 of the Convention.25
Principles to be drawn from the ECtHR decisions and the Venice
Commission reports
In the WP (Refah) and the People’s Labour Party (HEP) decisions of the ECtHR,
there appear to be two conditions for the prohibition of a political party. Either the
party concerned must resort to violent methods or call for violence, or the political
programme advocated by the party must be incompatible with democratic prin-
ciples. These criteria seem reasonable and in conformity with the words and the
spirit of the Convention. If one of these conditions do not materialize, the
simple fact that the political project proposed by the party means a radical
change in the current structure of a member state does not provide sufficient
grounds for its prohibition.
These criteria appear to be somewhat different from those proposed by the
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) of the Council
of Europe. In a report adopted in 1999 and entitled ‘Guidelines on Prohibition
and Dissolution of Political Parties and Analogous Measures’, the Commisssion
argues that
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prohibition or enforced dissolution of political parties may only be justified in the
case of parties which advocate the use of violence or use violence as a means to
overthrow the democratic constitutional order, thereby undermining the rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the constitution. The fact alone that a party advocates a
peaceful change of the Constitution should not be sufficient for its prohibition or
dissolution.
It thus appears that the Venice criteria are even less restrictive than those of the
ECtHR. In the explanatory report of the Venice Commission, it is stated that the
advocacy of violence includes ‘such specific demonstrations of it such as
racism, xenophobia and intolerance’. This statement seems to mean that racism,
xenophobia, and intolerance can be grounds for prohibition only if they involve
the threat of violence, but not as independent causes of prohibition. The explana-
tory report also states that ‘if relevant state bodies take a decision to seize the judi-
cial body on the question of prohibition of a political party they should have
sufficient evidence that there is a real threat to the constitutional order or citizens’
fundamental rights and freedoms’.26
The ECtHR’s ruling on the WP also contains important clues as regards the
timing of the prohibition ruling. Previously, the ECtHR had argued in its ruling
on the United Communist Party that the party’s prohibition violated the Conven-
tion in view of the fact that the party concerned had not yet engaged in any activi-
ties.27 In its WP decision, however, the ECtHR seems to have provided a greater
margin of appreciation for member states. Thus, the Court:
considers that a State cannot be required to wait, before intervening, until a political
party has seized power and begun to take concrete steps to implement a policy incom-
patible with the standards of the Convention and democracy, even though the danger
of that policy is sufficiently established and imminent. The Court accepts that where
the presence of such a danger has been established by the national courts, after
detailed scrutiny subjected to rigorous European supervision, a State may reasonably
forestall the execution of such a policy, which is incompatible with the Convention’s
provisions, before an attempt is made to implement it through concrete steps that
might prejudice civil peace and the country’s democratic regime.28
Thus, there appears to be a very marked difference between the approaches of the
Turkish Constitutional Court and the ECtHR in party prohibition cases. A number
of Turkish constitutionalists have pointed out this discrepancy. According to
Kaboğlu, ‘for the ECHR the determinant is democracy, and for the Constitutional
Court the integrity of the state’.29 Arslan argues that as opposed to the ‘ideology-
based’ paradigm of the Turkish Court, the European Court of Human Rights seems
to base its decisions, at least with respect to most political party cases, on the
“rights-based” paradigm that stands for a pluralist and libertarian position’.30
Erdem argues in the same vein that the Turkish Constitutional Court equates
behaving in accordance with the Constitution with thinking in accordance with
the Constitution. The Turkish Court considers the current constitutional system
of Turkey an ‘absolute and immutable value’ and closes down parties which
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develop a discourse incompatible with such system, whereas the ECtHR is of the
opinion that such proposals cannot be considered per se incompatible with
democracy, so long as they do not harm democracy itself.31
It thus appears that the Turkish Constitutional Court has given an excessively
rigid interpretation to the provisions of the Law on Political Parties, itself a product
of the military regime of 1980–83, and restricted the freedom of action of political
parties to a degree incompatible with democratic principles. The most marked con-
flict between the decisions of the ECtHR and those of the Turkish Constitutional
Court is in the cases involving the protection of the territorial and national integrity
of the state. On the other hand, there seems to be a degree of convergence on the
question of the protection of secularism, as attested by the two Courts’ decisions
regarding the WP. However, this convergence does not mean that the ECtHR
fully shares the Turkish Court’s interpretation of secularism. For example, it is
very doubtful that the ECtHR would have concurred with the Turkish Court’s
prohibition ruling on the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, VP), since this ruling was
based on the VP’s efforts to secure the abolition of the headscarf ban at univer-
sities.32 It is understandable to prohibit a party for trying to impose a ban which,
in itself, is incompatible with democracy. But it is certainly difficult to understand
the prohibition of a political party for having tried to abolish a ban, especially one
whose constitutionality is dubious.
All of the party prohibition rulings of the Constitutional Court analysed above
were rendered before the constitutional amendments of 2001 and 2004.33 Before
the 2001 amendment, paragraph 3 of the Transitional Article 15 precluded the
Constitutional Court from reviewing the constitutionality of laws passed during
the National Security Council regime (1980–83) including, of course, the Law
on Political Parties. Many Turkish constitutionalists were of the opinion,
however, that the Court could have developed a more liberal interpretation of
the Law on Political Parties without formally annulling it, as it did in the case of
the Democratic Peace Movement Party. The 2001 constitutional amendments
brought about two more improvements in the legal status of parties. One is that
if the Constitutional Court establishes the violation of one the constitutional
bans, it may decide to deprive the party from state funding partially or totally
instead of closing it down, depending on the gravity of the violations (Art. 69,
para. 7). The second is that a three-fifths majority instead of a simple majority, is
required for a prohibition ruling (Art. 149, para. 1).
The abolition of paragraph 3 of the Transitional Article 15 in 2001 offers
new possibilities for the Constitutional Court, which is now empowered to
annul those provisions of the Law on Political Parties if it finds them unconstitu-
tional. A second possibility is offered by the constitutional amendment of 2004,
which added a new paragraph to Article 90, according to which if there is conflict
between national laws and duly ratified international treaties concerning funda-
mental rights and liberties, international treaties shall take precedence. Obviously,
this Article refers not only to the texts of the treaties, but also to judicial decisions
concerning their implementation, including the decisions of the ECtHR.
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So far, the effects of these constitutional reforms on the liberalization of the
political party regime in Turkey have been limited. Thus, in 2008 the Constitutional
Court refused to close down HAK-PAR (Rights and Liberties Party), which advo-
cated extensive cultural rights for the Kurdish minority similar to those recognized
in such countries as Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria, and Kosovo. The party also advocated
extensive devolution of power to local authorities especially in the fields of edu-
cation, health, local security, and local taxes, and the popular election of governors,
sub-governors, and local security chiefs. It will be recalled that in the past such claims
resulted in prohibition rulings. This time, however, the Court concluded that as long
as these statements do not create an ‘open and present danger’ for democratic life,
they should be considered within the limits of the freedom of expression.34 It has
to be recalled, however, that an absolute majority of the judges (six votes) voted
in favour of closure, and that HAK-PAR was saved only thanks to the 2001 consti-
tutional amendment that required a three-fifths majority (seven votes) for closures.
The Constitutional Court was less tolerant of the AKP (Justice and Develop-
ment Party), the governing party of Turkey since 2002. Similarly to the HAK-
PAR case, the Court refused to close down the party with six votes in favour of
closure and five votes against. However, the Court decided by a one-to-ten majority
that the AKP had become a focal point of anti-secular activities and deprived the
party of half of its state funding for the next year. In this highly controversial
ruling, the Court persisted in its rigid and authoritarian conception of secularism.
Thus, the Court cited the 2008 constitutional amendment that aimed at the abolition
of the headscarf ban at universities (the amendment itself was invalidated by the
Constitutional Court by another controversial ruling) as the main piece of evidence
for the AKP’s allegedly anti-secular activities. However, the Court, citing a number
of democratic reforms realized by the AKP government as attenuating circum-
stances and, noting that the party was not involved in any act of violence,
decided to deprive it of half of its state funding instead of closing it down.35 The
Court’s persistence in its notion of militant secularism and the fact that both in
the HAK-PAR and the AKP cases an absolute majority of the judges were in
favour of closure indicate that the prohibitionist tendency of the Turkish Court is
still quite strong and that the constitutional reforms of 2001 and 2004 were not
sufficient to truly liberalize the political party regime in Turkey.
Another area where the Constitutional Court does not seem to have fully
grasped the meaning of recent democratic reforms concerns the possibility of
retrial in party prohibition cases. The Criminal Procedure Act numbered 5271
and dated 4 December 2004 (Art. 311) provides that in cases where a criminal jud-
gement is found to be in violation of the European Convention of Human Rights by
the European Court of Human Rights, this would be one of the grounds for a retrial.
However, the Court rejected the application of the United Communist Party of
Turkey (TBKP), banned in 1991. The closure of the TBKP was found to be in vio-
lation of the Convention by the ECtHR as was mentioned above. The Turkish
Court’s reasoning was that a retrial would be justified only in the existence of a
new ‘material fact’.36 This interpretation practically eliminates the possibility of
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a retrial on the basis of an ECtHR decision, as well as being in contradiction with
the explicit intent of the Law no. 5271 that considered the ECtHR’s rulings of vio-
lation an independent cause for a retrial.
A recent opinion by the Venice Commission (Commission for Democracy
through Law) of the Council of Europe (CDL-AD [2009]006) adopted at its
78th Plenary Meeting on 13–14 March 2009 clearly demonstrates the still wide
gap between Turkish constitutional and legal rules on party closures and the
general (or best) European practice in this regard. The Commission observes that:
the most striking feature of the Turkish rules on party closure is that they combine a very
long list of material criteria for prohibition or dissolution with a very low procedural
threshold . . . The basic problem with the present Turkish rules on party closure is
that the general threshold is too low, both for initiating procedures and for prohibiting
or dissolving parties. This is in itself in abstracto deviating from common European
standards, and it leads too easily to action that will be in breach of the ECHR, as
demonstrated in the many cases before the European Court of Human Rights.37
The Commission also observes that because of such low material and procedural
thresholds,
what should be an exceptional measure functions in fact as a regular one. This reduces
the arena for democratic politics and widens the scope for constitutional adjudication on
political issues. The scope of democratic politics is further eroded by the constitutional
shielding of the first three articles of the Constitution, in such a way as to prevent the
emergence of political programmes that question the principles laid down at the
origin of the Turkish Republic, even if done in a peaceful and democratic manner.38
The report ends with an invitation to Turkey ‘to make the necessary amendments to
the national constitution and legislation’ to ‘raise the general level of party protection
in Turkey to that of the ECHR and the European common democratic standards’.39
The Venice Commission also criticizes the Turkish procedure for prohibiting
parties, in that the power to start prohibition proceedings rests solely with the
Chief Public Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation. The
Commission is of the opinion that the Turkish model of giving this competence to one
official – the Public Prosecutor – makes the system subject to his discretion, which is
problematic since the initiation of the procedure by itself will normally be a dramatic
event that may have severe impact on the political climate and may cause consider-
able instability . . . [T]his stands in contrast to other European countries that have rules
on party closure, in which – because of the exceptional nature of such cases – the
decision to raise a case either rests with the democratic political institutions or at
least is subject to some element of direct or indirect democratic control.40
Conclusion
The Constitutional Court’s rulings on the AKP case and on the constitutional
amendment concerning the headscarf issue clearly show that the cleavage
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between the ultra-secularists and the religio-conservatives is at present the
dominant one in Turkish politics. The judiciary in general and the Constitutional
Court in particular seem to have sided with the ultra-secularists front. The ruling
against the AKP is clearly inspired by an exceedingly positivist and authoritarian
notion of secularism with probably no parallel in any Western democracy.
Similarly, the annulment of the constitutional amendment on the grounds of
being against the unamendable articles of the Constitution (i.e., secularism) not
only reflects the same mentality, but also amounts to a usurpation of the constituent
power by the Court, since under article 148 of the Constitution the Court is allowed
to exercise only a procedural, and not a substantive, review over constitutional
amendments. Furthermore, the Constitution limits such review to three specific
procedural defects, namely whether the amendment proposal is signed and
adopted by the requisite numbers of deputies and whether it is debated twice.41
The Constitutional Court’s ruling on constitutional amendments seems to have
closed the door to partial amendments unless they are approved by the Court. Thus,
in the spring of 2009 the AKP government seriously considered to submit a partial
constitutional amendment package, which, among other things, would change
the constitutional provisions on the prohibition of parties in line with the Venice
criteria. However, since the main opposition party, the Republican People’s
Party (CHP), which is entitled under Article 150 of the Constitution to request
an abstract review of it by the Court strongly opposed it, the plans were
dropped. Indeed, judged by its earlier rulings on party prohibition cases, the
Court would have been most likely to annul such an amendment as being
against the unamendable articles of the Constitution.42 Thus, the two rulings of
the Constitutional Court left the fate of further democratic reforms, including the
liberalization of the constitutional rules on the prohibition of parties, uncertain.
The only way out of this impasse is either to secure the cooperation of the CHP
(at the moment, a distant possibility), or to revive the AKP’s earlier project of an
entirely new democratic constitution based on a clear and strong popular mandate.
In conclusion, there is a wide gap between Turkish rules and practices on the
prohibition of political parties and the European standards developed by the
ECtHR and the Venice Commission. The long list of prohibitions in the Consti-
tution, and even more so in the Law on Political Parties, together with the low pro-
cedural threshold for initiating the prohibition cases, are further aggravated by the
excessively rigid interpretations of the Turkish Constitutional Court particularly in
cases that involve the territorial and national unity of the state and the principle of
secularism. This is one of the most serious democratic deficits of the Turkish
political system, with little likelihood of being remedied in the near future.
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Özbudun, ‘Turkey: Plural Society and Monolithic State’. For an analysis of Turkish
politics on the basis of the conflict between the state elites and the political elites,
Democratization 139
Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey. The exceptionality of the Turkish case has
attracted a great deal of attention by constitutional law scholars and political analysts.
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Kapatılması; Koçak and Örücü, ‘Dissolution of Political Parties in the Name of
Democracy’; Kogacioglu, ‘Dissolution of Political Parties by the Constitutional
Court in Turkey’.
3. http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/english.htm
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Can, Osman. Demokratikleşme Serüveninde Anayasa ve Siyasi Partilerin Kapatılması [The
Constitution and the Prohibition of Political Parties in the Journey toward Democracy].
Ankara: Seçkin, 2005.
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Koçak, Mustafa, and Esin Örücü. ‘Dissolution of Political Parties in the Name of
Democracy: Cases from Turkey and the European Court of Human Rights’.
European Public Law 9, no. 3 (2003): 399–423.
Kogacioglu, Dicle. ‘Dissolution of Political Parties by the Constitutional Court in Turkey:
Judicial Delimitation of the Political Process’. International Sociology 18, no. 1
(2003): 258–76.
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